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TO THE
PRINCIPAL MATTERS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME.
ACTION.
In order to maintain an action against the collector of the port, the
plaintiff must satisfy the jury that he has fully complied with all the re-
quirements of the statute, both as to form and substance. Gamble vs.
Mason, - - - 178
ACT OF ASSEMBLY, PENNSYLVANIA, April 12, 1851. See Bond.
ACT OF CONGRESS OF 1789. Exparle .Everts, - 79
ACT OF CONGRESS OF 1842. See Tariff.
ACT OF CONGRESS OF 1846. See Tariff.
ACT OF CONGRESS OF MARCH 3, 1851. See Collision.
ACT OF CONGRESS, MARCH 8, 1851. American Transit Co. vs. Mfoore, 15
ACT OF CONGRESS OF MARCH 3, 1857. See Tariff.
ACT OF OHIO, March 14, 1857, - 34- - 3
ADMIRALTY. See Lien.
Where a ship is detained in port by ice, and her cargo is damaged
before the season allows her to proceed, though she subsequently delivers
it to the consignees, a shipper cannot, without rescinding the contract, sus-
tain a libel in rem for a breach of the bill of lading, until the term for the
performance of the contract has expired. Jones vs. The Floating Zephyr;
Mytinger, &c. vs. the same, . . .. 494
The rule of navigation is emphatically settled that a vessel with the
wind free must give way to one close hauled; and a steamboat having the
control of her own movements by means of her own motive power, is
always treated as a vessel with the wind free. Red Bank Co. vs. The John
W. Gandy; Townsend vs. The Eagle, . .. . 606
The manoeuvre of fore reaching, even in a harbor, is not objection-
able, unless there be some reason to apprehend a collision by reason of
making it. .b.
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ADULTERY. See Larceny.
ADVANCEMENT.
If a father purchase land, and take the title in the name of his infant
child, it is deemed in law an advancement. and no trust results to the
father subject to execution at law; nor is the land liable for the subse-
quent debts of the father. Gaugh vs. Greenlaws, - - - 591
AGI3TER. See Trespass. .
AGREEMENT. See Insurance.
AMENDMENT.
A summons issued from the Marine Court, containing only the given
name of the plaintiff, may be amended by the clerk of that court, in the
presence and under the authority thereof, by inserting the surname, where
the defendant is not prejudiced thereby. Stanton vs. Leland, - 264
APPOINTMENT TO RECEIVE MONEY. See Assignment.
APPOINTMENT. See Dower.
ASSETS. See Partnernership.
ASSIGNEE. See Bankruptcy. Parties to BilL
ASSIGNABILITY.
A claim against an innkeeper for money stolen at the inn, from the
trunk of a guest, is assignable. Stanton vs. Leland, - - 264
ASSINGN'MENT. See Life Policy.
In Ohio, a failing debtor may prefer creditors, by assignment or other-
wise, if done under circumstances which repel the inference of a fraudulent
purpose. Coolidge vs. Curtis, . . . . . . 334
The Supreme Court of that State have decided that the act of the 14th
March, 1853, "declaring the effect of assignments to trustees, in contem-
plation of insolvency, and the statute of 1838, of the same import, do not
affect assignments or transfers made for the sole benefit of the assignees
or transferrees ; but if made trustees for other parties, the statute applies,
and the property is held for the equal benefit of all the creditors. Ibid.
But no trust will be implied merely from the fact that an assignment or
transfer has been made by an insolvent debtor to indemnify a surety for
such debtor, if no more property has been assigned than was necessary for
that purpose, and the facts warrant the presumption that nothing was de-
signed but the bona fide indemnity of the surety. Ibid.
Although such surety may be liable to respond to the creditors not pro-
vided for, for any surplus after paying the debts for which he was bound,
he is not a trustee within the contemplation of the statute referred to.
Ibid.
Where a mortgagor, after assigning a policy of insurance to secure his
mortgage debt, alienes, no recovery upon the policy, in case of subsequent
loss, can be had by the mortgagee. Grosvenor vs. Atlantic Mutual Insu-
rance Company, - 118
The mortgagee takes the assignment with knowledge that the contract
of insurance may be avoided by a failure on the part of the mortgagor, the
assured, to perform any of the conditions of the policy. Ibid.
Such transfer to a mortgagee is merely an appointment to receive any
money which may become due from the insurers by reason of loss sus-
tained by the mortgagor. Ibid.
As the rights of the appointee are wholly derivative, and cease with the
determination of the mortgagor's interest, no contract on the part of the
insurers is created by such transfer, to indemnify the mortgagee against
loss. Ibid.
ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY. See Insurance.
INDEX.
ATTACHMENT EXECUTION. See Execution Attachment.
AUTHORITY. See Contract.
BAIL BOND.
A bail bond taken by the sheriff which omits the name of the security
in the body of it, although signed and sealed by him, is a void bond, and
cannot be enforced. Adams vs. Hedgpeth, - 60
BANKER. See Execution Attachment.
BANKING.
It seems that the common law right of issuing paper, representing
money, and to be used as currency, by private bankers, has never bad any
existence by the usages of this country, such paper having uniformly been
issued by the government, or by banks authorized by government. Ander-
son vs. Alexander, . . .. .173
By the Constitution of Indiana, no bank of issue can be established,
except a State bank, and free or private banks, pursuant to the general
banking law. Ibid.
It hence appears that an association of individuals, for the purpose of
banking, not in pursuance of any statute law, is an illegal institution. Ibid.
BANKRUPTCY.
Under the United States Act of 181, no title passes on a sale and con-
veyance of a bankrupt's land by his assignee, unless it has been made in
pursuance of an express order of court to that effect, whether general or
special ; and it seems that the recitals in the assignee's deed will not be
sufficient evidence of such an order. Cleveland against Boerum, - 144
So where the land is held adversely at the time of the decree in bank-
ruptcy, a sale by the assignee more than two years after that date will
pass no title by force of the limitation in the eighth section of the Act. .bid.
BEAST. See Trespass.
BEQUEST.
A testatrix being possessed of cash in the house, a balance at a saving
bank, for the taking out of which she had given notice, and money secured
on two promissory notes payable on demand, by her will bequeathed "all
ready money." Held, that the terms "ready money"1 included the cash
in the house and the balance at the savings bank, but not the promissory
notes. Re Powell's Trust, - - - 311
BILL IN EQUITY. See Injunction.
BILL OF EXCHANGE. See Dishonor, Notice of.
An agreement was made between the drawer and acceptor of a bill of
exchange, at the time it was given, that the acceptor should deposit
with the drawer some canvas as a collateral security for the pay-
ment of the bill, with power to the drawer to sell the canvas and apply the
money arising therefrom towards the discharge of the amount of the bill,
should it not be paid at the proper time. The drawer endorsed the bill
after it was overdue, and on non-payment of the bill when due, sold the
canvas, and realized part of the amount of the bill: Held,.(affirming the
Judgment of the Court of Exchequer,) that the agreement between the
drawer and acceptor, as to the canvas, created an equity which attached
to the bill in the hands of the endorsee, who received it after it was over-
due; and, as the drawer, after the endorsement, had sold the canvas, and
retained the proceeds, the endorsee was prevented from recovering on the
bill for so much as the canvas realized on its sale. Holmes vs. Kidd and
another, . . .. . 563
BILL OF LADING. See Admiralty.
780 INDEX.
BILL OF REVIEW.
A bill of review should be filed in the court where the original cause
was heard, but the objection to the jurisdiction of another court is waived,
if not taken by a demurrer or plea. Gaugh vs. Greenlaws, - - 591
A bill of review will not lie, unless there be error apparent in the
body of the decree, without further examination; or new matter hath
arisen in time after the decree, or new proof came to light after the decree
made, which could not'possibly have been used at the time the decree
passed; and an infant defendant, if represented by a guardian ad litem,
will be subject to this rule. Ibid.
BOND. See Bail Bond. Note. Municipal Corporation.
A merely formal departure from the act of the Legislature, in the
mode of framing the bond, will not render it void.
Where the Legislature directed bonds of a city to be made "nego-
tiable and transferable by the order of the President and Directors" of a
railroad company, and the bonds on their face were made payable to the
"company and its assignee or bearer," such bonds were held to be valid.
Maddox vs Graham, - - - 746
The Pennsylvania Act of 12th April, 1851, authorizing the County of
Washington to subscribe to the stock of the lempfield Railroad, and to
issue in payment for the subscription, the bonds of the county, is not a
violation of either the constitution of the State or of the United States.
M'Coy vs. The County of Washington, - - - - 193
The issue of coupon bonds was authorized by the Act. Ibid.
It is not necessary in a suit by the holder of the bonds or the coupons to
show that a subscription was in fact made, the bond reciting the fact. Ibid.
BREACH OF DUTY. See Master and Servant.
BREACH OF THE PEACE.
Where an ordinary driver of a passenger railroad line is driving for hiro
for the company in the business of transporting passengers on and along
the railway track on the Sabbath day, for the usual week-day fare, he is
guilty of a breach of the peace. Commonwealth vs. Jeandell, - - 615
When worldly employment is carried on in such a manner and in such a
place as to dibturb the peace and religious exercises of the community,
either at home or in churches, and cannot be restrained by the imposition
of the penalty in the act, such circumstances constitute a breach of the
peace. Ibid.
CARGO. See Contribution.
CARRIER.
See Contract. Insurance. Navigation. Negligence.
Where an action was brought for the non delivery of certain goods en-
trusted to the owners of the propeller Spaulding, which were put on board
at Buffalo, to be transported to Detroit, and which were accidentally burned
without negligence, it was held that, inasmuch as the less occurred on a
lake vessel engaged in commerce within the jurisdiction of Congress, the
owners of the propeller were exonerated from liability under the act of
March 8, 1851, passed to limit the liability of ship owners. The Anieri-
can Transportation Company vs Moore, - - - 15
A limitation alleged by a carrier as one of the terms of his contract, is
a question of fact, and must be shown affirmatively before ajury. Ibid.
CARRIER OF PASSENGERS. See Negligence.
CASES AFFIRMED.
Commonwealth vs. Johnson, 10 Harris, 102; 2 American Law Reg., 285,
in Commonwealth vs. Jeandell, - - - 015
CASES APPROVED.
Grosvenor vs. The Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, 3 Smith, 391;
in Belson vs. The Man. Insurance Company, - - - 6G1
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State Mutual Insurance Company vs. Roberts, 7 Casey, 440; 7 Ameri-
can Law Reg 229; in Belson vs. Manufacturing Insurance Company, 661
Allegheny Bond Case, in Maddox vs. Graham, - - - 746
CASES COMMENTED ON.
Pratt vs. Reid, 19 How. 359, and Tefferson vs. Beers, 20 How. 393, com-
mented on in Colles vs. The Comonw., - - - 5
CASES DISSENTED FROM.
Traders' Insurance Company vs. Robert, 9 Wend, 404; 17 Tb., 631, - 121
Tillou vs. Kingston Insurance Company, 1 Sold. 405. See Grosvenor vs.
Atlantic Mutual Insurance Company, - - - 125
Wheeler vs. Williamson, 4 American Law Register, 5. See ex parte
Everts, -. .. . 89
CATTLE. See Negligence. Trespass.
CAUSE OF ACTION. See Negligence.
CHAMPERTY. See Guardian.
CHANCERY.
A decree in chancery obtained by fraud, is void, and a court of chancery
upon original bill will set it aside, and restore the party defrauded to his
former situation and rights. Gaugh vs. Greenlaws, - - - 591
Equity favors innocent purchasers without notice, who have paid a full
consideration and taken conveyance for land; but where a purchaser has
actual or constructive notice of an outstanding title, he will not be pro-
tected against it. IIbid.
CHARGE OF JUDGE.
When the court is asked to, and does, charge the jury as to the conclu-
sive nature of a written contract between the parties, if they shall find
such contract established by the evidence, and there is no proof in the case
showing, or tending to show, a written contract of the kind mentioned in
the charge, such charge is improper, as tending to mislead the jury. Ame-
rican Transportation Company vs. Moore, - - - 325
CITY ORDINANCE, See Passenger Railway.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA. See Orphan.
CIVIL LAW.
See Partnership-Leading Article, . . . . 129
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See Bill of Exchange.
COLLECTOR. See Action.
COLLISION.
The Tuscarora and the Andrew Foster, two American ships, came in
collision in the Irish channel, whereby the latter ship, together with her
cargo, was wholly lost. The owners of the cargo of the Andrew Foster
attached the Tuscarora in the English admiralty, and she was condemned
to damages; upon a bill filed in the Lord Justices' Court, asking for the
benefit of the English Merchant's Shipping Act of 1854, which is similar
in its provisions to the Act of Congress of March 3, 1831, it was held, that
inasmuch as both ships were foreigners, the American owner could not
avail himself of the British statute before an English court. Cope vs.
Doherty, - - 181
It would seem that neither the English nor the American statute can be
made available to the American shipowner, in case of collision between
foreign ships, where the cause is before an English tribunal. Itbid.
COMMON CARRIER.
Although it devolves upon a common carrier to show affirmatively the
terms of any contract which lessens his common law liability, yet that fact
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is to be proved like any other, by any pertinent evidence. If in writing,
the writing must be shown ; but, if by parol, there is no rule which re-
quires different proof from that which would establish any other contract.
Thejury must be satisfied, from the evidence, that a certain contract ex-
ists ; and, if satisfied, that is sufficient. American Transportation Com-
pany vs. Moore, - - - 352
CONDITIONS OF POLICY. See Insurance.
CONSENT. See Jury.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
See Banker. Bond. Fraud. Legislative Authority. Municipal Sub-
scription. Mandamus. School.
Acts of Legislature authorizing subscriptions by municipal corpora-
tions to railroad companies, are constitutional. Maddox vs. Graham, - 746
The regulation of the School Committee of Boston, which requires that
pupils in the public schools shall, among other things, "learn the Tea
Commandments, and repeat them once a week." is not a violation of the
constitutional provision which secures to the citizen liberty of conscience
and of worship. Commonwealth on complaint of Wall vs. Cooke, - 417
CONSTRUCTION.
Acts authorizing subscriptions by corporations are to be construed
strictly against the corporation and in favor of the holders of the bonds.
Maddox vs. Graham, .. . . 746
CONSTRUPTION OF STATUTE.
If the construction of a State statute has been settled by the decision of
the highest court of the state, the courts of the United States uniformly
adopt such construction. Coolidge vs. Curtis, - - - 334
CONTRACT.
See Assignment. Insurance. Lien. Master and Servant. Sale.
Usury.
Whether, in a particular case, a merchant in New York, shipping goods
to his correspondent in the interior, had authority to make a contract on
behalf of the correspondent for shipment, on different terms from those
ordinarily adopted by common carriers, is a question of fact, to be deter-
mined by the jury upon the evidence; and the court cannot, properly, be
asked to make any charge that shall absolutely dispose of the fact in con-
troversy. The American Transportation Company vs. Moore, - - 352
Where a party contracts for transportation over a route composed of
several railroads, for which he pays an entire sum, and receives a through
ticket or receipt, the contract is entire, and not of several distinct liabili-
ities. If no partnership in fact exist between the roads, he may treat the
contract as entire, or several, so far as the other parties are concerned.
Check vs. The Little Miami Railroad Company, - - - 427
By the appointment of a common agent to receive the entire considera-
tion, and issue through tickets and checks, which they recognize and
assume, the several companies are made aware that the contract is treated
by the passengers as entire, and not several. ibid.
If the agent at the starting point fails to disclose his principals, and to
contract on their behalf, whether jointly or severally, he, or the company
represented by him, may be treated as sole principal; but if the contract
be, in fact, entire, and he is, in fact, dealing for others who receive the
benefits of the contract, the other contracting party may look to the real
principals, and subject all who are interested in the joint contract. Ibid.
The delivery of a check to a passenger is intended to relieve him of any
care or superintendence of his baggage. while on its journey, and devolves
such care upon the agents of the several roads over which it passes. Ibid.
A corporation can make no valid contract except in the course of its
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business and within the scope of its charter, and any departure from that
business is an excess of authority in its officers. Pearce vs. The Madison
and Indianapolis Railroad Co., and the Peru and Indianapolis Railroad
Co. - . .. . 409
Two railroad corporations, before the date of the notes on which this
action was brought, were consolidated by special agreement, but without
authority of law, and acted under a common board of management, and
thus carried on the business of both roads, and while so acting purchased
a steamboat, for which the notes were given. They afterwards dissolved
their joint business relations, and each road conducted its own affairs;
while united the notes sued on were given. Held, first, that persons deal-
ing with the defendants must take notice of the limitations imposed upon
their authority by the act of incorporation, and second, that these notes
not having been given by authority of law, no recovery could be had on
them. Ibid.
The legislative pledges of the public faith, and of the public works and
their income, as security for the money borrowed to construct the works,
is not a contract that can be enforced by the judiciary of the State Sun-
bury and Erie Railroad vs. Cooper, - - - 158
CONTRIBUTION.
The true rule with regard to the right to contribution in the maritime
law, is the achievement of the object designed, even for a short period of
time, by the sacrifice of the property; and this will be sufficient to give
rise to and justify contribution, notwithstanding there may be a subsequent
loss, provided the latter results from a new peril. In the matter of the
Cargo of the Great Republic, . . . .- 271
In a case where the following facts appeared-that the original or pri-
mary cause of the loss was an accident, not the subject of general average ;
that the proximate cause of the preservation of all that was saved was the
scuttling of the ship; that the immediate cause of the scuttling was a fire
between the lower decks of the vessel; that such fire was brought there by
a burning spar which had been cut away by the voluntary act of the crew;
that such act, instead of averting the peril it was designed to prevent, was
the real and efficient agent of the loss that followed: Held, first, that the
direct damage to the cargo in the lower hold, as well as that to the ship's
knees and timbers by the scuttling, is a proper subject for contribution:
Second, no damage to the cargo between decks and on fire, arising from
the water thrown in, is a proper subject for contribution. Ibid.
Methods of computing and rules for contribution suggested. Ibid.
CORPORATION.
See Contract.
A deed of land by the corporation to two of its directors is void as
against creditors of the corporation Cleveland vs. The La Crosse and
Milwaukee Railroad Co., Chamberlain, Kneeland and others. - - 536
A lease of a railroad and rolling stock, with the power in the lessee to
run the road and to purchase additional rolling stock at his discretion, and
to extend the road out of the proceeds or revenue, the lease being for an
indefinite term of time, is void as against creditors of an insolvent com-
pany, for hindering or delaying them in the collection of their debts. Ibid.
COUNTY COMMISSIONER. See Mandamus.
COUNTY SUBSCRIPTION. See Bond.
COUPON. See Bond. Municipal Corporation.
Coupons are prima facie evidence that the holder is also the holder of
the bond from which they are cut, or else was so when they were separa-
ted. McCoy vs. County of Washington, - - - 193
CREDITOR. See Assignment,
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CRIMINAL LAW. See Jury.
CUSTODY OF CHILD. See Habeas Corpus.
DAMAGES.
It is a settled principle, that whenever any act injures another's rights.
and would be evidence in future in favor of a wrong-doer, an action may
be maintained for an invasion of those rights; although there be no proof
of any specific injury. The Delaware and Hudson Canal Company vs.
Torrey, - . - 611
Hence, when saw-dust from the defendant's mill floated down into the
plaintiff's basin, although it alone might not cause inconvenience to the
plaintiff. but accompanied with saw dust from other mills, the plaintiff's
flowage was obstructed: it was held, that the defendant's deposit of any
saw-dust was an actionable injury, inasmuch as it violated the plaintiff's
rights. Ibid.
In order to maintain an action under the 9 and 10 Vict. c. 93, actual
damage must have accrued from the death of the deceased. Proof of the
death and relationship of the parties does not give a right to nominal dam-
ages. Duckworth, Administrator, vs. Johnson, - - - 630
In an action under that statute by a father for the death of his son, it
was shown that the deceased earned a certain weekly sum, which he
brought into the general stock of the family :-Quere, whether, in order
to maintain the action, the plaintiff should have given evidence that the
weekly expense of keeping the deceased did not exceed that amount?
Ibid.
Where a negro slave, confined in jail on the charge of rape and murder,
was taken by the defendants, acting in concert with a mob, from the she-
riff's custody and hanged, it is such a deliberate, premeditated and vio-
lent destruction of the plaintiff's property, as to entitle him to vindictive
damages. Polk vs. Fancher, - - - 675
It is not permitted to prove, in such cases, in order to diminish the pecu-
niary value of the slave, that he was apprehended for rape and murder;
was infamous, and therefore of no value. Ibid.
Where in an action for damages upon an alleged libel, the judge at
the trial instructed the jury that if they found for the plaintiff, the amount
of their verdict was in their absolute discretion, and that such discretion
was uncontrolled by any legal rule or recognized measure of damages, it
was held erroneous. Thompson vs. Keereber, - - 0
The judge should have charged the jury that if they found for the
plaintiff, they should give such an amount of damages as in their opinion
would be an adequate compensation to the plaintiff for the injury actually
sustained by him: and if the libel originated in malice, in their opinion,
they might give such additional damages as they thought would justly
punish the defendant. Ibid.
DEATH. See Damages.
DEED. See Corporation. Equity.
DEED OF GIFT. See Dower.
DELIVERY. See Sale. Usage.
DEPOSIT. See Execution Attachment.
DEPOSIT OF POLICY WITH CREDITOR. See Life Insurance.
DIRECTORS. See Corporation.
DISHONOR, NOTICE OF.
In an action by the endorsee against the drawer of a bill of exchange
on B, the following writing was held to be a sufficient notice of dishonor:
"B's acceptance to J," (the defendant,) "for 5001., due on the 12th
January, is unpaid. Payment to R. & Co. is required before four
o'clock." Paul vs. Joel, . .. . 681
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DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP, .- 129
DISTRIBUTION. See Partnership.
DOWER.
Where A made to B a deed of gift, embracing both personalty and
realty, in which deed was a special power in the nature of an appoint-
ment, which B executed by his last will according to the terms of the
power: Held, that the wife was not entitled to dower in the realty so con-
veyed by deed of gift. Thompson vs. Vance, - 222
EJECTMENT. See Injunction.
ENDORSEMENT. See Bill of Exchange.
ENGLISH MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT 1854. See Collision.
EQUITY.
See Bankruptcy. Injunction. Mandamus. Parties to Bill.
Partnership.
The power of the Court of Equity to reform deeds in cases of fraud, is
constantly exercised, and cannot now be questioned. Barnes vs. Gregory, 678
Where the proof leaves no doubt that the sale of land was by the acre,
and not in gross, and was so understood by both parties, and the vendee
receives more land than he pays for, the vendor can compel payment for
the whole quantity sold. Ibid.
EVIDENCE.
See Common Carrier. Damages.
Parol evidence of an agreement between the Railroad Company and the
Commissioners of the County, that the county should not be called upon
for the interest, is inadmissible to affect the right of the holder of the
coupons to recover. McCoy vs. County of Washington, - - - 193
EXAMINATION OF THE CASE OF SCOTT vs. SANDFORD, 19 Howard
S. C. Rep. 393, . .. . . . 322
EXECUTION ATTACHMENT.
The funds of an insolvent corporation in the bands of a banker, are
liable to execution attachment by a creditor of the corporation, and it is
no defence that the banker is also a creditor of the corporation to an
amount-exceeding the funds in his hands. Penrose vs. Erie Canal Com-
pany, . .. . 126,
Money of a company deposited by the treasurer as such, is the money
of the corporation in the hands of the banker. Ibid.
FENCE. See Negligence.
FERRY. See Negligence.
FOREIGN ACT. See Collision.
FOREIGN SHIP. See Collision.
FRAUD See Injunction.
No court has authority to entertain a question that involves a charge. of
fraud in the legislature, as a means of setting aside a public law passed
by it. Sunbury and Erie Railroad vs. Cooper, - - 158
A party who has obtained the passage of a private Act of Assembly by
bribery, imposition, or other fraudulent means, would, perhaps, not be
entitled to any benefit from it, if the fraud be shown. Ibid.
No court has authority to entertain a charge of dishonest motives against
the legislature as a means of showing that any act of legislation is uncon-
stitutional. Ibid.
FUND (JOINT). See Partnership.
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GIRARD'S WILL. See Orphan.
GUARDIAN.
A purchase of land by a guardian ad litem of an infant defendant, pend-
ing a suit in chancery involving the title to the land, is champertous and
void. Gaugh vs. Greenlaws, - - 591
GUEST. See Innkeeper.
GUNPOWDER. See Insurance.
HABEAS CORPUS.
The first clause of the 14th Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which
provides that the Supreme, Circuit, and District Courts of the United
States "shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus,
and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which may be
necessary to the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law, does not authorize said courts to issue a
habeas corpus, unless it is necessary in aid of jurisdiction, in a case or pro-
ceeding there pending. Ex parte Everts, - -- 79
The case of a father claiming the custody of an infant child, is not
one in which a habeas corpus can issue, by a court of the United States,
as ancillary to the exercise of its jurisdiction, under the above cited clause
of-the Act of '89. Ibid.
Nor can a Circuit Court of the United States take jurisdiction under the
l1th Section of the Act of '89, although the father is the citizen of another
State, as the matter in dispute has no pecuniary value, and cannot be esti-
mated in money. Ibid.
HOUSE. See Right of Support.
INDIANA. See Banking.
INJUNCTION.
Where partners make a settlement under the sanction of an award of re-
ferees, and certain conveyances are made in pursuance of such settle-
ment, and it afterwards turns out, upon a second reference, that the part-
nership dealings and accounts are adjusted in another manner by reason
of a mistake in the first reference, but the matter of the division of certain
land was not brought before the second reference, equity will enjoin, by
perpetual injunction, an action of ejectment brought by one against the
other. Farris vs. Kirkpatrick's Heirs and Administrator, - - 672
INJURY. See Damages.
INLAND NAVIGATION. See Navigation.
INNKEEPER.
The liability of an innkeeper extends to money stolen from the trunk of
a guest. Stanton vs. Leland, . . ..- 264
Where the guest, having packed his luggage for departure, locks his
room, gives notice thereof to a clerk, and leaves the key of the room with
such clerk, at the office, the innkeeperwill be responsible for money stolen
from a trunk, although a notice may have been brought to the knowledge
of the guest, requiring money and valuables to be placed in a safe at the
office, during his sojourn at the inn. Ibid.
An innkeeper, being responsible for the safe keeping of such goods,
property, and money in packages, as the guest brings with him to the inn,
can rightfully require permission to take the actual custody of money,
jewels, and goods of especial value, not required by the guest for his daily
use and convenience, and to place them in such safe depository within the
inn as he may provide. Ibid.
And notice of such requirement being actually given to the guest, orally
or by a printed notice furnished to and read by him, it is his duty to con-
form thereto, and if he do not, and a loss is'suffered in consequence, with
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the actual fault of the landlord and his agents, the landlord is not liable
for the loss. ibid.
INSOLVENT CORPORATION.
See Execution Attachment.
INSURANCE. See Life Insurance. Assignment.
A loss which arises from the efforts made to prevent goods from being
destroyed by fire, must be borne by the assurer, and not by the insured,
whether the particular injury in question be produced by water used to ex-
tinguish the flames, or results from dangers, such as theft, to which the
property is exposed in an attempt to remove it to a place of safety. Ag-
new vs The Insurance Company,- - - - - . 108
A mortgagor effects a policy of insurance against fire, which provides
that the insurers' liability should cease upon assignment of the polieq with-
out theirconsent: and that it should become void in case of the termination
of the interest of the insured in the subject of the insurance. Subsequently
the mortgagor makes an assignment of all his title and interest in the policy
to the mortgagee-in visualjuxtaposition to the policy, though without the
written consent of the insurers, and a renewal is effected and premium
therefor paid by the mortgagee. Mortgagor then conveys the fee to the
mortgagee.
Held, That the Court properly instructed the jury that if the existence
of the assignment was known to the assurers, the act of renewal included
the consent required by the policy.
Bield, however, furthermore, that the assignment to the mortgagee only
operated as an equitable transfer of the policy, and that tle approval of
the assignment by the insurers did not convert his contract into a neoo one
for the independent insurance of the mortgagee. Bilson vs. The Manu-
facturers' Insurance Company, -- -661
The transfer of the property to the mortgagee, so as to divest the mort-
gagor's (the plaintiff's) interest, has the same effect as if the conveyance
had been made to some third person other than the mortgagee, there being,
in both cases, a change of interest in the subject of the insurance. Gros-
venor vs. The Atlantic Mit. Ins. 0o., 3 Smith, 391, and The State Hiut. Ins.
Co. vs. Roberts, 7 Casey, 440; 7 Am. Law Reg., 229, approved. Ibid.
A clause in a policy of fire insurance, that the insnrers should not be
liable for a loss from an explosion of gunpowder, applies to the case of a
fire originating from the explosion of gunpowder on the premises. Green-
wald vs. The Insurance Company, - - -- 282
Where, to stay tile spread of flames, a house already on fire is blown up
with gunpowder, there being no means of extinguishing fire by water in
the town, the insurers are liable. Ibid.
The plaintiffs, common carriers, effected an insurance against fire with
defendant; one of the conditions of the policy was, that "goods held in
trust or on commission are to be insured as such, otherwise the policy will
not extend to cover such property." £15,000 was declared to be'insured
on "goods, their (the plintiffs') own, and in trust as carriers," on certain
premises therein named, and the insurers were "liable to pay, reinstate,
or make good, at their option, as to the said assured, all damage or loss
which the said assured shall suffer by fire on the property herein particu-
larized, not exceeding on each item the sum hereinbefore declared to be
insured."
Held, That the policy extended to cover the whole value of any goods
sent to plaintiffs to be carried, and not merely the plaintiffs' interest as
carriers :
Held, further, that plaintiffs could recover the value of a package of silk
destroyed on the said premises, by fire, although it had not been declared
as required by the Carriers' Act, and therefore they would not be liable
as carriers for its loss. The London and North-western Railway vs.
Glyn,- ----- 693
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A voyage that is insured, must be so conducted as not to change the risk
insured against. If the usual mode, or the agreed mode of conducting it
be changed, without a necessity arising from a danger insured against, the
risk is changed. Merchants' Insurance Company vs. Algeo, . - 608
When a party gets insurance on a voyage to be conducted in a prescribed
mode, he must be understood as stipulating that that mode is practicable
and shall be followed. If then the voyage in that mode is not practicable,
at a certain stage of water, he has no insurance when attempting it at
that stage. Ibid.
The insured has no right to change the terms of the policy by choosing
to start at a time that makes the change necessary. A change from ne-
cessity is one arising from a cause discovered after the commencement of
the voyage. Ibid.
A policy of insurance against fire, assigned as collateral security for a
mortgage, is liable to be avoided in the hands of the mortgagee, by any
subsequent breach of the conditions of the insurance by the owner of the
property, though the assignment may have been duly approved by the
Insurance Company. State Mutual Insurance Company vs. Roberts, - 229
Where a policy so assigned, and duly approved, contained the usual pro-
vision, that "if the insured, or his assigns, should thereafter effect any
other insurance on the same property, and should not with all reasonable
diligence give notice thereof-and have the same endorsed on the policy,
or otherwise acknowledged in writing, the policy should cease and be of
no further effect," and the mortgagor subsequently, without the know-
ledge of the mortgagee, effected another insurance on the property, which
he neglected to give notice of, it was held that the first insurance was
thereby avoided, and that no recovery could be had thereon by the mort-
gagee. Ibid.
Where, in a policy of insurance, the excepting clause was in these
words-" it is understood that this company is not liable for any break-
age or derangement of the engine, or bursting of the boiler, or any of the
parts thereof, or for the effects of fire connected with the operation of, or
the repairs of the engine or boiler, unless the damage be occasioned and
the repairs rendered necessary by the stranding or sinking of the vessel,
after her engines and boilers shall have been put in successful opera-
tion"-it was held, that the purpose of the exception was only to relieve
the underwriters from liability to indemnify the assured for broken or
deranged machinery, and not to exemhpt them from the obligations to pay
for a total loss, even though that loss could be traced back to the break-
age of the machinery. The Western Insurance Company vs. Cropper, 237
INTEREST.
See Bond. Insurancc.
INTERPLEADER.
On an execution in a county court against the goods of the defendant,
in a suit of A. vs. B., certain goods in the hands of C. were seized, who
paid a sum of money to release them, and proceeded by interpleader. It
appeared that the goods originally belonged to B., but previous to the
execution had been pawned with a pawnbrobker, (it did not appear by
whom,) and the duplicates had been deposited in the hands of C. by L. to
redeem them, and hold them as security for the money advanced, who re-
deemed them accordingly. There was no evidence to show the time at
which, or the circumstances under which L. became possessed of the du-
plicates, or that he had any interest therein: Held, that C. was entitled
to the money paid to release the goods. Furber vs. Sturmy, - - 296
INTERPRETATION. See Insurance.
JUDGE. See Question of Law.
JUDGE'S CHARGE. See Libel.
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JUDGMENT.
A valid judgment and execution must be shown by a party who seeks to
support a title to land under a sheriff's deed for the same. Gaugh vs.
Greenlaws, - - - 591
JURISDICTION.
See Habeas Corpus.
A county, as a municipal corporation, may be sued in the courts of the
United States.
Tile holder of a coupon bond payable to bearer, being a citizen of a
different State from the defendants, and entitled to sue in the courts of the
United States, though the previous holder of the bond might not have been
so entitled to sue. M'Coy vs. County of Washington, - - - 193
Specific performance is not a proper form of remedy for refusal to carry
out a contract for the purchase of bonds of an Improvement Corporation;
there being ordinarily an adequate remedy by the common law action for
damages. But those courts that have original jurisdiction of the cause of
action, and authority to follow both equity and common law forms, may
give redress in such a case in the equity form, if there be no demurrer to
.the form. Sunbury and Erie Railroad Company vs. Cooper, - - 158
Specific performance of a contract to purchase bonds of the Delaware
Division Canal Company, is not within the original jurisdiction of the Sn-
preme Court in bane; but at Nisi Prius they have original jurisdiction of
such a breach of contract, and may give redress in the equity form, if there
be no demurrer to the form. Ibid.
JUROR.
See Jury.
JURY.
See Question of Law.
When a juror is withdrawn from the panel at a criminal trial, even by
consent, the fact must be noted of record. Commonwealth vs. Shaw, - 289
The record must show that twelve jurors were sworn, and if it appear
that less or more than twelve delivered the verdict, it is error. Thid.
Waiver by consent of a prisoner in a criminal case, is a nullity. Ibid.
JURY, DISCRETION OF.
See Libel.
LAKE COMMERCE.
See American Transportation Company vs Moore, - 15
LARCENY.
The prisoner and the prosecutor's wife were jointly concerned in remov-
ing certain goods of the prosecutor from his house. They conveyed the
goods to a distant place, where the wife took lodgings in her own name,
and was afterwards found living with the prisoner. The prisoner was tried
for stealing the goods, and on the trial the wife was examined on his behalf,
and swore that they had not gone away for the purpose of carrying on an
adulterous intercourse, and never had committed adultery together. The
jury were directed, that if they were satisfied that the prisoner and the
prosecutor's wife, when they so took the property, went together for the
purpose of having adulterous intercourse, and had afterwards effected that
criminal purpose, they ought to find the prisoner guilty; but if they be-
lieved the wife, that they did not go away with any such criminal purpose,
and had never committed adultery together at all, the prisoner would be
entitled to his acquittal. The jury convicted the pr;soner, and the ques-
tion was reserved as to whether the direction was right :-Held, that it
was. Reg. vs. Berry, - - - 80
LEGISLATION.
See Passenger Railway.
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LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY.
See Fraud. Contract.
The Legislature has authority to sell the public works constructed by
the State, and the courts have no authority to declare the sale void for in-
adequacy of price, or for any undue favor to local interests supposed to
have influenced the sale. Sunbury and Erie Railroad vs. Cooper, - 158
The Act of Assembly of 21st April, 185-38, authorizing the sale of the
Slate Canals, is not unconstitutional. Ibid.
LIABILITY OF SHIP OWNERS.
See American Transportation Company vs. Moore, - 15
LIEN.
Where the outfit and supply of materials for building and equipping a
vessel, and making her ready for sea, by furnishing ship-chandlery, sails,
rigging, materials, &c., were bought in New York, and sent to Plymouth,
North Carolina, and used by the vessel, which rendered her seaworthy,
and enabled her to make voyages and earn freight; it was held, in com-
pliance with the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Pratt vs. Reid, 19 How. 359, and Jefferson vs. Beers, 20 How. 393, that
no admiralty lien existed, and no jurisdiction attached in the Court of Ad--
miralty. Collis vs. The Ccernine, - - - - - - 5
A contract made in a port of the United States, to construct a vesser in
a port of another State, by actually building her or by supplying materials
for such construction, is not a maritime contract, creating a lien upon the
vessel for the value of the materials, supplies, or labor, which is enforce-
able in the admiralty. Ibid.
LIFE INSURANCE.
Where the life policy contained a provision that should the assured com-
mit suicide the policy should be void, and the assured died by his own
hand, being of unsound mind as found by the coroner'sjury; held that the
state of mind of the party committing suicide was not material, and that
"suicide" could not be distinguished from "dying by his own hand ;"
which has been held to be within a like proviso. Dufaur vs. The Profes-
sional Life Assurance Company, . . . . 301
Where the assured had deposited the policy with a creditor as security
for a debt due and for advances, without notice of the deposit to the office,
and the assignee had continued to pay the accruing premiums; held that
it was a valid deposit and assignment, and that the assignee, who was also
administrator, was entitled to recover the advances made for the assured's
benefit. Ibid.
A life policy contained the following condition: "This policy will be
void if the life assured die by his own hands, the hands of justice, by duel-
ing. or by suicide: but if any third party have acquired a bona fide inte-
rest therein by assignment, or by legal or equitable lien for a valuable
consideration, or as security for money, the assurance thereby effected
shall nevertheless, to the extent of such interest, be valid and of full effect."
On the 9th July the assured became bankrupt according to the laws of
Valparaiso, and his property then vested in the escribano, or officer of the
court, who took possession, and on the 15th July assignees were appointed,
to whom all the property passed by operation of law. On the 14th July
the assured committed suicide. Held, that the assignees were not entitled
to the benefit of the policy under the above condition, but that the condition
was intended to apply where there was a contract and a transfer by the
parties. Jackson vs. Forster, . . .. 302
LIMITATION. See Carrier.
LIVE STOCK. See Carrier.
LOSS. See Insurance.
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MANDAMUS.
At common law, the relator might move to disallow the return to a mand-
amus, and if deemed insufficient, a peremptory mandamus would be allowed,
but since the statute of June, 1836, the relator must either demur, plead,
or traverse to the return. The Commonwealth vs. The Commissioners of
Allegheny County, . .. .. 92
Mandamus is the only adequate remeay for a municipal bondholder
against public officers, in case those officers refuse to assess and collect the
tax to meet the interest on said bond, when the law requires them to do
so. Ibid.
The fact that 300 bond creditors would be required to sue twice a year
for their interest, would render the ordinary common law action for debt
an inadequate remedy. bid.
Mandamus is the proper remedy whenever an act of Parliament or the
Legislature gives power, or imposes an obligation on particular persons to
do some particular act or duty, and provides no specific legal remedy for
non-performance. Ibid.
The allegation of a return to a writ of mandamus must be direct, and
stated in the most unqualified manner, not argumentatively. .ibid.
Tie negotiation of bonds at. a rate below that prescribed by law does not
invalidate them; but quiwre, whether a municipal corporation might. not
obtain equitable relief by means of a reduction of their amount to the sum
actually paid, provided a proper case could be made before a chancellor.
Ibid.
Mandamus is the proper legal remedy against a municipal corporation
refu.ing or neglecting to levy a tax to pay interest on the bonds issued by
the corporation. Maddox vs. Graham, - - - 746
It will be granted on the petition of an individual bondholder. Ibid.
Where a party by his conduct shows he does not intend to do an act
required by law, an express demand and refusal is not necessary before the
granting of the writ of mandamus. Ibid.
It is sufficient to allege in the writ. that the petitioner is the owner of
bonds with coupons attached, and unless there be a clear and unequivocal
denial of this allegation, no further proof of ownership is necessary. .bid.
MARITIME LEGISLATION.
See American Transportation Company vs. Moore, - - 15
MASTER AND SERVANT.
By an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant, the former agreed
to serve the latter for the term of ten years as a servant (a brewer,) and
that he would during that time well, truly and faithfully serve him; and
the defendant agreed that during the said term he would pay the plaintiff
the weekly sum of 21. 10s. During the service under the agreement, the
defendant had an attack of rheumatic gout, which required him to remove
to a distance for change of air. He was absent thirteen weeks, atter which
he returned to his service. The defendant having refused to pay him the
weekly sum of 21. 10s. during these thirteen weeks, the plaintiff brought
the present action: Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Cuck-
son vs. Stone, - . . . . . . 250
A master is not liable for an injury to a servant occasioned by the break-
ing of a flag, where the master's knowledge of the defect in the flag was
not alleged. Totts vs. Plunkett, - . . . . 555
A muster is not bound to warrant each servant his safety in the course of
his common employment. Ibid.
The facts must be stated out of which an alleged breach of duty arises.
Ibid.
It is not necessary that a plaintiff should negative everything which
might constitute a defence, but he must affirm everything which would
constitute a liability on the part of a defendant. Ibid.
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MASTER. See Seaman.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES. See Damages.
MISDIRECTION. See Question of Law.
MISTAKE. See Equity. Injunction.
The duty of the Governor in granting letters patent to a corporation
under the general railroad law of 1849, in Pennsylvania, upon the certifi-
cate of the commissioners named in the special act of incorporation that
the provisions of the general law have been complied with, is of a discre-
tionary, and not of a ministerial nature, and cannot, therefore, be inter-
fered with by injunction or mandamus. Mitcheson vs. Harlan, - - 468
The commissioners named in a special act of incorporation under the
general railroad law having, as was alleged, acted, in taking the subscrip-
tions to the stock of the company, in a fraudulent and illegal manner, a
bill was filed on behalf of persons who had been thus prevented from sub-
scribing to restrain the promoters of the company from applying for letters
patent, and from proceeding to organize the company by the election ofofficers
and otherwise, and also to have the former subscriptions declared void, and
the commissioners directed to open a new subscription, and for these pur-
poses an injunction was applied for. The Governor in the meantime
granted the letters patent, which fact was alleged in a supplemental bill.
The injunction was refused by the court, on the ground, that it was too
late to prevent the issuing of the letters, and that to prevent the further
organization of the company would amount to a forfeiture of the charter,
which could only be done at law by scirefacias or quo warranto. Ibid.
Where the original bill is for any reason fatally defective, it cannot be
made the basis of a supplemental bill. Ibid.
MORTGAGE. See Assignment. Insurance.
MUNICIPAL BOND HOLDER. See Mandamus.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Bond.
A municipal corporation has not, in general, power to make ordinances
for the construction of canals, turnpikes, or railroads, beyond the territorial
limits of its jurisdiction; nor to borrow money and pledge or encumber the
individual property of its citizens for that purpose. (Ebricke and Com-
pany vs. The City of Pittsburgh, -. . . .. 725
Where special legislative authority is asserted for such purposes, it
must be shown to have been conferred in express terms, and is not to be
assumed from inference or construction. Ibid.
The Pennsylvania Act of April 4, 1837, to incorporate "The Pittsburgh,
Kittanning and Warren Railroad,"which provides that "any incorporated
company, city, or borough, shall have authority to subscribe" to the stock
of that company "as fully as any individual," only authorizes a municipal
corporation to subscribe to the stock, not to issue bonds or to tax the pro-
perty of the corporators to pay the subscription on the bonds or their inter-
est; and the Act of 14th April, 1852, does not extend the powers of such
corporation in this respect. The bonds issued by the city of Pittsburgh,
under these acts, ruled to be void. Ibid.
Under the Act of 21st April, 1852, to incorporate the Pittsburgh and
Steubenville Railroad, which authorizes the city of Pittsburgh to subscribe
to the stock of that company, and to borrow money to pay therefor, but
provides "that no certificate of loan or bond shall be for a less sum than
$100, and shall be transferable only on the books of the corporation."
The city issued coupon bonds, with a blank power of attorney to transfer
on the books of the city, endorsed. Ruled, that the holder of coupons of
these bonds in suing thereon, must show himself to be an assignee of the
bonds on the books of the city, as the mere possession of a coupon gives no
right of action unless where the bonds are properly payable to bearer.
Ibd.
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But the coupon bonds issued by the city of Pittsburgh under the Act of
May 8, 1854, supplementary to the charter of the Pittsburgh and Steuben-
ville Railroad, ruled to be valid, and that suit might be brought by the
holder of the coupons thereof. Ihid
The Act of 7th February, 1853, incorporating the Chartiers Valley Rail-
road which authorizes subscription by the city of Pittsburgh to the stock
of that company, provides that the certificates of loan or bonds issued
for that purpose, "shall be transferable as shall be directed by the said
corporation." The city issued coupon bonds. In an action on certain
coupons detached from these bonds, ruled that though no ordinance of the
city was shown to authorize the issue of the bonds in that form, it was to
be presumed that it was so directed by the city. Abid.
MUNICIPAL SUBSCRIPTION.
Although doubts may have been entertained by a minority of the court
at a former period, as to the constitutionality of a municipal subscription
for general railroad purposes, yet after the announcement of a solemn
judicial decision by a majority of the court, the question is to be considered
at rest. Commonwealth vs. Commissioners &c., . . . . 92
NAVIGATION.
See Admiralty.
The navigation of the great American lakes, and their connecting
waters, is not "Inland Navigation" within the meaning of the Act of Con-
gress entitled "An Act to limit the liability of ship-owners, and for other
purposes," approved March 3d, 1851. And, therefore, where goods were
entrusted to a common carrier, to be transported from New York to De-
troit, by way of Lake Erie and the Detroit river, and while upon the
steamboat of the carrier, in the harbor of Buffalo, in the course of transit,
were destroyed by fire, without any negligence or fault on the part of the
carrier or his agents, the carrier is not liable to the owner for the loss.
American Transportation Company vs. Moore, . . . . 352
NEGLECT.
See Seaman.
NEGLIGENCE.
See Master and Servant.
The lessee of a ferry hired of the defendants for the daya steamer, with
a crew, to carry his passengers across. The plaintiff, having paid his fare
to H, passed across on the steamer, and while on board was injured by the
breaking of a rope, owing to negligence of the crew in the manner of
mooring :-Held, that the crew remained the servants of the defendants,
who were therefore liable for their negligence; and that, as the negli.
gence was such as would have made the defendants liable to a mere
stranger, and the plaintiff was on board with their consent, it was imma-
terial that he was a passenger under a contract with H. Dalyell vs.
Tyrer, .. .. 440
The declaration alleged that the defendants were possessed of a steamer
navigated by their servants; that the plaintiff was lawfully, and with the
defendants' consent, a passenger for hire on board the steamer; that it
was the duty of the defendants' to navigate the steamer with reasonable
care and skill, and to provide proper tackle, &c. That the de-
fcndants did not navigate with reasonable care and skill, and did
not provide proper tackle, whereby and by the breaking of a rope,
the plaintiff was injured. Pleas, not guilty; that the defendants
were not possessed of the steamer navigated by their servants: that
the plaintiff was not lawfully, and with the defendants' consent, a pas-
senger for hire on board the steamer; and a traverse of the alleged duty
of the defendants. A verdict having been found for the plaintiff.-Held,
on a motion to enter the verdict on each or any of the pleas for the de-
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fendant, and in arrest of judgment, that the above facts sufficiently proved
the allegations traversed; and that the declaration disclosed a sufficient
cause of action. Ibid.
Where a common carrier of live stock, as horses, permits a shipper to
put straw into a car, although the company's agent told the shippers that
if straw was used it must be at the shipper's own risk, and the shipper
has signed a release from all claims for damage to live stock while in the
company's cars, and the straw is fired and damage ensues to the animal,
this is negligence, and the carrier is liable on his contract. Powell vs.
The Pennsylvania Railroad Company, .. . . 348
When the Court was requested to charge under the above facts, that if
there was liability to fire from the locomotive, it was negligence for the
the carrier to permit straw, which is a combustible material, to be used in
the car, and if the jury find that the fire originated from that cause, the
carrier is liable, it is error to refuse so to charge. Ibid.
A railroad company is liable for injuries to cattle occasioned by thegross
negligence of its servants in the management of its engines, though the
cattle were at the time trespassing on the line of the road, but without
direct negligence on the part of their owner. Dictum in Clark vs. Syra-
cuse, 6-c. 1. 1 Co. 11 Barb. 112, dissented from. Stucke vs. The Mil-
waukie and Mississippi Railroad Company, - - 732
The company, on the other hand, under such circumstance is not bound
to the use of more than ordinary care. And where the owner of the cattle
has himself been guilty of negligence, in allowing the beasts to be at large
upon or in the vicinity of the road, or had suffered them to range in
places where it was even remotely probable that they would stroll on the
track ; or being present at the time of the injury, made no effort to re-
move them, he would not be entitled to recover except for willful injuries.
Ibid.
A railroad company, in the 'absence of any statutory provision, is not
bound to fence in its track. Ibid.
In actions where there has been mutual negligence on the part of the
plaintiff and defendant, and the negligence of each party, or of the plain-
tiff alone, has been the proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff cannot
recover; otherwise, where the negligence of the defendant has alone been
the proximate cause of the injury. Ibid.
NEGOTIATION OF BONDS. See Mandamus.
NISI PRIUS. See Jurisdiction.
NON-RESIDENT. See Tax.
NOTE. See Contract. Pledge.
NOTICE (IN EQUITY.)
Whatever is sufficient to put. a purchaser on inquiry is equal to notice,
and he is bound at his peril to take notice of every deed, necessary to
make out his title; and if his title deeds lead to facts disclosing an adverse
title, the law charges him with knowledge of such facts. Gaugh vs.
Greenlaws, - . . . . . . 591
A mortgage is not such an outstanding legal title as will repel an inno-
cent purchaser without notice, the legal title is deemed to remain in the
mortgagor. Ibid.
ORPHAN.
On the construction of the Will of Stephen Girard, the word "orphan,"
held to mean afatherless child, and not necessarily one who has lost both
parents. The City of Philadelphia et al. vs. Soohan, by his next Friend, 386
The preference directed by the testator to be given to orphans born in
the "City of Philadelphia," among applicants for admission to the College
to be established under his Will, applies to the city as it was laid out by
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William Penn, and existed at the death of the testator, and not as it was
subsequently increased in territorial limit. Ibid.
PAROL CONTRACT.
SEe Usage.
PARTIES TO BILL.
Where, pending a bill to foreclose a mortgage, the mortgagee becomes a
bankrupt. it is not necessary to make his assignee a party to the suit; and
a valid foreclosure and sale of the mnrtgaged premises may be made,
though the latter be not substituted. Cleveland vs. Bcerum, - - 144
PARTNERSHIP.
See Injunction.
It is a rule of equity in the distribution of the joint and separate assets
of insolvent partners, that the individual assets of a partner be first ap-
plied to the debts of his individual creditors, and the partnership assets
first to the partnership debts-the preference of the separate creditors in
the individual property resulting as a necessary correlative from the
priority of the joint creditors, in the joint effects inseparable from the
nature of the relation of the partners to each other. Rogers, Assignee, vs.
'Merauda, Assignee, .. . . . 35
This rule does not apply when there is no joint estate for distribution,
and no living solvent partner. Ibid.
But where there are both joint and separalc effects for distribution, the
joint creditors can, in equity, only look to the surplus of the separate
estate of a partner, after the payment of his individual debts. Ibid.
And the individual creditors can, in like manner, only seek distribution
from the partnership effects, out of the surplus of the jointfund after pay-
ment of the partnership debts. ibid.
The individual creditors of a partner are not entitled to an equal distri-
bution with the partnership creditors out of the joint effects, on account
of an indebtedness of the firm to such partner for money loaned by him to
the firm, unless the money loaned was obtained by the firm fraudulently,
or advanced by the partner with an improper design to augment the joint
estate by a reduction of the separate estate. Ibid.
PASSENGER RAILWAY.
Where, in an act of the legislature incorporating a City Passenger Railway,
it was provided that the consent of the City Councils, to use or occupy the
streets should be firstobtained before said company should construct their
track, and the City Councils by ordinance declared their disapproval of the
said act and declined to allow the streets to be so used, it was held that
the power designated by the legislature was exhausted and that no subse-
quent ordinance of the City Councils consenting to the use of the streets
upon certain conditions could revive the privilege nullified, by the ordi-
nance of disapproval. Musser et al. vs. The Fairmount and Arch Street
Railway Company, - - 284
PENNSYLVANIA ACTS.
See Bond. Municipal Corporation.
Act of April 4th, 1837.
Act of April 21st, 1852.
Act of February 7th, 18.53.
PLEADING.
See Master and Servant. Negligence.
PLEDGE.
A pledge for a loan of moneyto be repaid at afixed time, maybe sold by
the pledgee, after the time for redemption has gone by, and a demand for
repayment duly made, provided reasonable notice be also given to the
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pledger, of the time and place of the intended sale. Riehards' Adminis-
trator vs. Davis, . . . . . . . 483
The law is the same -where the pledge is a promissory note of a third per-
son, when the note will not mature until long after the time fixed for
repayment of the loan. Ibid.
POLICY. See Insurance.
POWER. See Dower.
PROCEEDING IN REM. See Admiralty.
QUESTION OF FACT.
Plaintiff's men were driving thirty-six oxen along the road between five
and six o'clock of an evening in November; twenty-three escaped into a
field of defendant's adjoining the road, through gaps in his fence. The
men drove on the remaining thirteen to the nearest obtainable place of
safety for the night, and returned (having been absent about an hour) for
the other twenty-three left in defendant's field. Defendant had then im-
pounded them, for which the plaintiff brought this action. The learned
judge at the trial directed the jury that, under the circumstsnces of the
case, the plaintiff's men had not removed, or tried to remove, the cattle
within a reasonable time, and directed a verdict for the defendant:
Held, (Bramwell, B dissentiente,) to be a misdirection ; that it-was not
a question of law for the opinion of the judge, but a question of fact upon
the evidence given, that should be determined by the jury, and conse-
quently there must be a new trial. Goodwyn "j8. Chaveley, - - 684
QUESTION OF LAW. See Question of Fact.
RAFT. See Sale.
RAILROAD.
See Bond. Carrier. Contract. Corporation. Negligence.
All trusts depend much upon the implications growing out of the state
of the property, the purposes desired to be accomplished, and the mode
provided for that end. Sturges vs. Knapp and the Troy and Boston Rail-
road Company, - - - 203
This is true, to a great extent in regard to all contracts. It is only by
means of the constructive addition§ and limitations imposed by courts,
that a brief memorandum of a contract is ever made to speak truly and
fully the mind of the parties. Ibid.
But upon no subject is there so much demand for the exercise of con-
struction, and of judicial implications, as in regard to trusts; and espe-
cially trusts of a complicated and public character. And these are not
less a part of the contract than its most express provisions. Ibid
All corporate action, as well that of the directors and agents, as of the
corporation itself, is but a succession of trusts, in regard to which the
creditors of the corporation, in the order of their priority, are the pri-
mary, and the shareholders the ultimate cestuis que trust. Ibid.
The trust imposed upon the trustees in the first instance, and before
foreclosure, is fiduciary and active. Ibid.
After the foreclosure, and until the cestuis que trust are in a condition
to act for themselves, the trustees are bound to control and manage the
property, in the best mode for all concerned. Ibid.
After the surrender of a railroad to the trutees upon the forfeiture,
and before foreclosure, and while that state of the property might fairly
be presumed to be but temporary, the trustees could not be expected to
surrender the trust to the cestuis que trust. Ibid.
And after the foreclosure, the necessity of action is so pressing and the
difficulty and consequent delay so great, in effecting any legitimate action
of the cestuis que trust, that there seems an absolute necessity for the
trustees continuing the management of the property for the time being
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and until it can properly be taken into custody of the cestuis que trust.
Ibid.
The mode of management must be such as a prudent and experienced
owner would adopt under the circumstances of the case. Ibid.
In this case, the trustees having no rolling stock and no means of pur-
chasing any, could not be expected to attempt operating the road on their
own account, except as matter of strict necessity, and when it was prac-
ticable. Ibid.
As they had the opportunity of leasing rolling stock for this road, or
leasing their property to a connecting road, they might fairly decide be-
tween these modes. And having made a short experiment of hiring roll-
ing stock, and experienced a serious loss for the time, it was natural and
proper to effect a lease with a connecting road. Ibid.
This they did in a reasonable and prudent manner, as it seems to us.
Ibid.
The term being absolutely for one year, with the right to allow it to
extend to ten years, if no notice to the contrary were given, was all that
could be desired on the part of the lessors. Ibid.
The rent was favorable, and the clause for renewals and repairs being
such as is necessary to maintain the works in proper condition for use,
"natural wear only excepted," was all that could be expected or desired.
Ibid.
The statute of this State enabling our roads to lease to toads connect-
ing with them at the line of the State, and those interested in the Troy
and Boston Company not objecting to the lease, and the State of New
York having taken no measures to avoid the contract or interfere with
that company on that account, the plaintiffs cannot object to the supposed
want of authority in the lessees. Ibid.
The lease cannot be avoided on the part of the lessors or those they
represented, on the ground of any informality in its terms or unreason-
ableness in its provisions, unless a case is shown of want of power, that
the contract is ultra vires. Ibid.
RAILROAD SUBSCRIPTION. See Injunction.
"READY IONEY." See Bequest.
RES JUDICATA. See Municipal Subscription.
RETURN. See Mandamus.
RIGHT OF SUPPORT.
Plaintiff owned a house, adjoining it was a house of a third person, and
adjoining this third person's house were two houses of defendants. The
four houses for more than thirty years past were, all of them, out of the
perpendicular, leaning to the west. Defendants contracted to have their
houses (which were the most westward) pulled down, and others erected
in their places. The contractor pulled them down, and by so doing the
plaintiff's house fell and did damage: Held, that the plaintiff had not
established his claim to a right of support for his house, and enjoyed as
of right from the defendants through the medium of the plaintiff's house
being supported by the intermediate house which leaned upon the defend-
ant's. Solomon vs. The Vintners' Company, - - 622
SALE.
See Bill of Exchange. Pledge.
S. had a raft which had been measurLd by an official person as of 71,443
feet, and putting this measurement in G's hands, agreed as follows: "Sold
to G. a raft, the quantity about 71,000 feet, to be delivered at the I.
booms, price 7Jd. per foot." S. conveyed the raft to the L booms, giving
noticethereof to G.'s servants, who helped to fasten it there. A storm having
arisen and destroyed the raft: Held, affirming the judgment of the court
of error, Upper Canada, that there was evidence for the jury of delivery,
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and they having found the fact of delivery, the risk fell on G., for the con-
tract did not imply that anything more was to be done by S. on his own or
on G's behalf, or in which both were to concur before the property passed.
Gilmour vs. Supple, - - - 230
SALE OF LAND.
See Equity.
SALE BY THE ACRE.
See Equity.
SCHOOL.
A teacher in the public schools has a right to enforce a regulation,
by the corporal chastisement of a child refusing to repeat the Ten Com-
mandments, though that refusal proceeds from a conscientious objection
on the part of the child to the particular version of the Bible used, and is
made by the direction and under the authority of his father. Common-
wealth vs. Cooke, 417
The authority of a parent cannot justify the disobedience, by a child, of
the regulations of a school. Ibid.
SEAMAN.
A seaman receiving an injury in the performance of his duties must be
cured at the expense of the ship. Brown vs. Overton, - - - 413
On a voyage from Calcutta to Boston, and twenty-five days before pass-
ing in sight of St. Helena, a seaman fell from aloft and broke both legs.
Held, that it was the duty of the master to have put into St. Helena for
the cure and relief of the seaman. Ibid.
The master was also held responsible for neglect during the passage and
after reaching Boston. ibid.
SET-OFF.
A set-off can properly be pleaded only where the parties are the same
and the debts mutual. Hurdle vs. Hanner, - - - 58
SHERIFF. See Judgment.
SLAVE. See Damages.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See Jurisdiction.
STATUTE LAW. See Banking.
STATUTE REQUIREMENTS. See Action.
STEAMBOAT. See Admiralty.
SUICIDE. See Life Insurance.
SUNDAY. See Breach of the Peace.
SUPREME COURT. See Jurisdiction.
TARIFF.
The 20th section of the tariff act of 1842, is still in force, and is em-
bodied in the act of 1857. Gamble vs. Mason, - 178
That whether an article imported into the country, and which is not
specifically enumerated in the schedule of the act, bears a similitude in
material, quality, texture or use, to one which is enumerated, is a question
which a jury must determine. Ibid.
TAX.
The statute of the State of New York, which provides that all persons
doing business in the State of New York, as merchants, bankers, or other-
wise, and not residents of the State, shall be assessed and taxed on all sums
invested in their business, the same as if they were residents of the State,
is not in conflict with any provision of the Constitution of the United
States. Duer vs. Small, Receiver of Taxes, - 500
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TEACHER. See School.
THEFT. See Insurance.
TRANSPORTATION. See Contract.
TREASURER. See Attachment. Execution.
TRESPASS.
The owner of a beast. prone to commit trespasses, is liable for its injuri-
ous acts without regard to the degree of care bestowed in controling it.
Rossell vs. Cottom, - 405
Trespass cannot be sustained against the owner of cattle, from injury
committed while in the custody of an agister; if liable at all, he is liable
only in case. Jbid.
TRUST.
See Assignment. Insurance. Railroad.
UNDERWRITER.
See Insurance.
USAGE.
A written contract expressed that defendant had bought ", fifty tons of
best palm oil, expected to arrive in Bristol from Africa, per the Chalco, at
401. 10s. per ton, usual tare and draught. Wet, dirty, and inferior oil, if
any, at a fair allowance; and if any difference should arise, the same to
be settled by arbitration." In an action for not accepting the oil, parol
evidence was admitted of a usage of trade at Bristol, to show that a
delivery of a substantial portion of best oil with inferior descriptions, in
the proportion of one-fifth best and four-fifths inferior, would have been a
compliance with the contract :-Held, that the written contract having left
undefined what portion of the oil was to be wet, dirty and inferior, the
evidence of usage was admissible as explaining its terms. Lucas and
others vs. Bristowe, . . .. 306
USURY.
The statute of the State of New York, that no corporation shall inter-
pose the defence of usury, does not extend to suits against accommodation
endorsers for corporations. Tie Market Bank of Troy vs. John B. Smith,
Vliet, and Richards, - ' - - 667
Quere. Where the law of a State forbids a corporation taking over a cer-
tain amount of interest, is a contract for a greater amount void? If not
void, the surplus interest paid should be credited to the debtor, as not
collectable. Ibid.
VINDICTIVE DAMAGES.
See Libel.
VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.
A voluntary conveyance in Tennessee, (prior to the act of 1852,) could
not be set. aside as fraudent against creditors, except at the suit of a
creditor whose debt was ascertained by judgment. Gaugh vs. Greenlaws, 591
VOYAGE. See Insurance.
WAGES See Master and Servant.
WAIVER. See Jury.
WIFE. See Larceny.
'WILL. See Bequest.
WITHDRAWAL OF JUROR. See Jury.

